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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action regarding the 
priority of security interests in merchandise, inventory, 
work in process, raw materials and other assets (herein-
after "transferred assets") transferred from Nuclear Con-
trols and Electronics Corporation (hereinafter "Nuclear") 
to Summit International Corporation (hereinafter "Sum-
mit"). Plaintiff-Appellant First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. (hereinafter "First Security") and Defendant-Re-
spondent Zions First National Bank (hereinafter "Zions") 
each claim a prior and superior security interest in the 
Case No. 
14010 
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translerred assets and in the cash and non-cash proceeds 
arising therefrom. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 11, 1975, the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Jr., District Judge in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict in and for Salt Lake County, granted Zions' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
First Security seeks reversal of the Order and Judg-
ment of the Third District Court on the ground that 
there are material and genuine issues of fact which must 
be resolved at trial, on the ground that there is a possi-
bility of new evidence in this case which would be favor-
able to First Security and on the ground that Zions is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There has been no determination made by a trier 
of fact as to what the actual facts of this case axe. Al-
though some additional discovery would be required prior 
to trial, the following sequence of events and related 
claims represent the facts as alleged by First Security 
and as supported by the Record now before the Court 
DECEMBER 5, 1972 
Zions entered into an Inventory and Accounts Re-
ceivable Security Agreement with Summit (Record, pp. 
21-22). At the time the above mentioned security agree-
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ment was entered into, Summit's sole business was the 
marketing of calculators manufactured by Nuclear. Sum-
mit had no manufacturing activities (Record, p. 17) . 
DECEMBER 6, 1972 
Zions filed its financing statement relating to the 
Summit security agreement with the Utah Secretary of 
State (Record, p. 23). 
JULY 30, 1973 
First Security entered into an Inventory Financing 
Security Agreement with Nuclear which covered all of 
Nuclear's inventory, including work in process, raw ma-
terials and stock in trade, without limitation, and all 
after-acquired inventory and any proceeds arising there-
from (Record, pp. 51-52). First Security and Nuclear 
also entered into a Security Agreement Covering Revolv-
ing Accounts Receivable and any proceeds arising there-
from (Record, pp. 53-54). 
JULY 31, 1973 
First Security filed its financing statement relating 
to the Nuclear security agreements with the Utah Sec-
retary of State (Record, p. 55). 
ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 1, 1974 
Nuclear owed First Security $831,770.00, which 
amount remains unpaid (Record, p. 47). Without the 
knowledge or consent of First Security, Trans-Atlas Cor-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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pocnation, the parent corporation of both Nuclear and 
Summit, caused an inter-company transfer of personnel 
and of all assets and inventory pertaining to the manu-
facture of hand calculators from Nuclear to Summit, The 
transferred assets were valued at $2,097,184.00 (Record, 
p. 48). There was no consideration for this transfer. The 
transfer did not entail the actual movement of physical 
asset but was a paper transaction only (Record., p. 17 
and Deposition of Jerry W. Dearinger, p. 5). At all times 
prior to this transfer, Zions knew that Summit's inventory 
consisted solely of completed band calculators (Record, 
p. 17). There was no work in process, component parts 
or assembly machinery included in Summit's inventory 
prior to the transfer by Nuclear to Summit on oar about 
January 1, 1974 (Record, p. 17). 
Zions was in control of the financial affairs of Sum-
mit, and Zions had prior notice or was informed very 
shortly thereafter of the transfer of inventory and other 
assets from Nuclear to Summit and of First Security's 
attached and perfected first priority security interest in 
the transferred assets (Record, pp. 17, 48, 49). 
On or after January 1, 1974, Zions did not advance 
any additional funds to Summit (Record, p. 49). 
FEBRUARY 12, 1974 
After discovering the transfer of Nuclear's assets to 
Summit, First Security entered into an Inventory Financ-
ing Security Agreement and a Security Agreement Cov-
ering Revolving Accounts Receivable with Summit (Rec-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
ord, pp. 56-59). These security agreements contained 
language drafted by Jerry Dearinger, Summit's attorney, 
concerning Zion's security interest in Summit's presently 
held accounts receivable. 
FEBRUARY 22, 1974 
First Security filed with the Utah Secretary of State 
its financing statement relating to the Summit Security 
Agreements (Record, p. 60). 
TO DATE 
Zions has managed and maintained control of all 
accounts receivable of Summit during 1972, 1973, 1974 
and 1975 to date (Record, p. 17). All monies collected 
by Summit have been required to be deposited with Zions 
where daily balances could be ascertained at all times 
(Record, p. 17). 
At all relevant times hereto Zions was aware of the 
claimed security interests of First Security and was in a 
position to protect the security interest of First Security 
in the transferred assets as well as its own security in-
terest in certain accounts receivable of Summit (Record, 
p. 49). 
Zions made no effort to refute First Security's claim 
of first priority on the transferred assets until several 
months after Zions became aware of said claim and the 
assets of Summit had been dissipated (Record, p. 50). 
The proceeds from the transferred assets in which 
First Security claims a prior security interest can be 
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traced and separated from the assets of Summit in which 
Zions has a security interest (Record, p. 50), 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE REMAIN GENUINE ISSUES OF 
FACT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW 
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WHICH WOULD 
BE FAVORABLE TO FIRST SECURITY. 
This Court in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Cen-
ter, Inc., 11 U. 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960) stated: 
A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions, and inferences which when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser 
shows that, "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." Such 
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility 
that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evi-
dence which would reasonably sustain a judg-
ment in his favor. Id. at 4-5. [Emphasis added.] 
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U. 2d 30, 395 P. 
2d 62 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that: 
On summary judgment the adversed partyis 
entitled to have the court survey the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to him. 
Id. at 31-32. 
This Coin* held in Reliable Furniture Co, v. Fidelity 
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& Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 U. 2d 211, 
398 P. 2d 685 (1965), that the adverse party's: 
. . . contentions as to the facts should be consid-
ered in the light most favorable to him, and only 
if it clearly appears that he could not establish a 
right to recovery under the law should such ac-
tion be taken; and any doubts which exist should 
be resolved in favor of affording him the privi-
lege of a trial. Id. at 216-217. [Emphasis added.] 
The specific areas where facts are either in dispute or 
funther discovery is required are pointed out in the Argu-
ments that follow and are summarized in the Conclusion 
of this brief. 
POINT II. 
FIRST SECURITY HAS AN ATTACHED 
AND PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST 
IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS AND IN 
ALL CASH AND NON-CASH PROCEEDS 
ARISING THEREFROM. 
A. First Security Has An Attached And 
Perfected Security Interest In The Transferred 
Assets. 
First Security has a valid security interest in the 
transferred assets arising from security agreements be-
tween First Security and Nuclear which were executed 
on July 30, 1973. The financing statement pertaining 
to the transferred assets was filed with the Utah Secre-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tary of State on July 31,1973. As stated in Section 70A-
9-306(2) II C. A., 1953, a security interest continues in 
collateral after a transfer: 
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise pro-
vides, a security interest continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposi-
tion thereof by the debtor unless his action was 
authorized by the secured party in the security 
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in 
any identifiable proceeds induding collections 
received by the debtor. [Emphasis added.] 
In Inter Mountain Association of Credit Men v. The 
Villager, Inc., U. 2d , 527 P. 2d 664 (1974), this 
Court held that a security interest continues in collateral 
notwithstanding its transfer. 
Section 70A-9-306 (2) provides that a security in-
terest continues in collateral notwithstanding 
sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the 
debtor unless his action was authorized by the 
secured party in the security agreement or other-
wise, and also continues in any identifiable pro-
ceeds, including collections received by the 
debtor. Since the financing statement was prop-
erly filed, plaintiffs assignor had notice of de-
' fendanfs security interest in the collateral and 
proceeds, as well as the provision in the secur-
ity agreement that provided that the collateral, 
inventory, whenever acquired would secure the 
obligation covered, Section 70A-9-204(3) U. C. 
A., 1953, as amended 1965. Id. at 670-671. [Em-
phasis added.] 
There appears to be no dispute between First Secur-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Jty and Zions that First Security had a prior and superior 
security interest in the transferred assets and in any pro-
ceeds arising therefrom up to February 12, 1974 
B. First Security Was Not Required To 
File Additional Financing Statements To Protect 
Its Security Interest In The Transferred Assets. 
At the time the transfer became known to First Se-
curity, security agreements were entered into between 
First Security and Summit to give further public notice 
that First Security claimed a security interest in the 
inventory and other assets transferred by Nuclear to 
Summit. Another financing statement was duly filed with 
the Utah Secretary of State on February 12, 1974. As 
to Zions, First Security had no duly to file this new 
financing statement. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Inter Mountain Associa-
tion of Credit Men v. The Villager, Inc., supra, cites with 
approval In Re Posco Sales Co., Inc., 77 Misc. 724, 354 
N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1974), to illustrate the principle that the 
filing provision of the Code is to give notice and start 
investigation. 
Although the purpose of the filing provisions 
of the Code is to afford protection to a creditor 
by furnishing notice to interested parties, these 
provisions are intended merely as "a starting 
point for investigation which will result in fair 
warning concerning the transaction contem-
plated." [Emphasis added.] [Citation} It was 
not intended, therefore, that the interested par-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ties be completely absolved from any inquiry as 
to the past history of the debtor. (See, e.g., Uni-
form Commercial Code, Section 9-401(3).) Id. 
at 671. 
The Utah Supreme Court then concludes: 
A debtor cannot destroy the perfected security 
interest of a secured party by merely changing 
its name or corporate structure, particularly 
when there is no evidence to indicate that the 
secured party had any knowledge thereof. Id. at 
671. 
The record shows that Zions was aware of the trans-
fer of assets from Nuclear to Summit before or shortly 
after it occurred. Inasmuch as the security agreements 
and financing statement of First Security pertaining to 
the assets of Nuclear were matters of public record at 
the time of the transfer, Zions had constructive notice 
of First Security's prior security interest in the trans-
ferred assets. Further, First Security alleges title facts 
will show that Zions had actual knowledge of First Se-
curity's prior security interest in the transferred assets 
at or near the time of transfer. 
Therefore, the filing by First Security of the Summit 
security agreements and financing statement was not 
necessary to notify Zions, but the filing was done for the 
purpose of giving the public additional notice of First 
Security's interest in the transferred assets. 
C. The Language Contained In First Se-
curity's Agreements With Summit And The Fi-
nancing Statement Relating Thereto Does Not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Affect First Security's Prior Security Interest 
In The Transferred Assets. 
The language inserted into the security agreements 
between Summit and First Security merely indicates that 
First Security was not attempting to claim a superior 
position in the assets of Summit "presently subject to 
security interest of Zions First National Bank" (language 
taken from financing statement). [Emphasis added.] In 
other words, First Security was not claiming a first pri-
ority security interest in those assets of SUmmit which 
were NOT transferred from Nuclear. 
The principle of preserving a Hen solely in transferred 
assets was reiterated by this Court in Inter Mountain 
Association of Credit Men v. The Villager, Inc., supra: 
Section 16-10-71 (e) U. C. A., 1953, as amended 
1961, does not extend the Men upon the property 
of a constituent corporation to the property of 
the other constituents or the survivor but merely 
prohibits the impairment of the lien upon the 
property of the constituent by the merger. The 
statute indicates an intent that property ac-
quired solely in connection with the business of 
a particular predecessor be treated as though ac-
quired by the predecessor, and be subject to the 
lien of that predecessor's mortgage to the same 
extent as if it were continuing. If the lien upon 
the property of the constituent corporation were 
extended as urged by defendant, the rights of 
the creditors of the other constituent corpora-
tions would be impaired as a result of the mer-
ger in violation of the express provisions of the 
statute. Id. at 672. [Emphasis added.] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Thus, First Security could not and did not claim an 
interest in the accounts receivable held by Summit prior 
to the transfer. 
[It should be noted that discovery may show the 
so-called "transfer" was a constructive merger in which 
case the provisions of Section 16-10-71 (e) U. C. A., 1953, 
as amended 1961, would be directly applicable.] 
D. First Security Has A Security Interest 
In Any Cash And Non-Cash Proceeds Arising 
Out Of The Sale Of The Transferred Assets. 
Not only does First Security have a security inter-
est in those assets transferred from Nuclear to Summit, 
but First Security also has a continuing security interest 
in the proceeds arising from the sale of such assets. As 
stated in 70A-9-306(2) U. C. A., 1953: 
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise pro-
vides, a security interest continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposi-
tion thereof by the debtor unless his action was 
authorized by the secured party in the security 
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in 
any identifiable proceeds including collections re-
ceived by the debtor. [Emphasis added.] 
First Security's security agreements with Nuclear 
and the financing statement relating thereto covered all 
proceeds from Nuclear's inventory or accounts receivable. 
Neither Nuclear nor First Security haifr received any pro-
ceeds from the sale of the transferred assets. These 
proceeds have all been appropriated by Zions. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The proceeds from the transferred assets in which 
First Security has a first priority position are identifiable 
and can be traced by the trier of feet. Tracing in this 
matter would be no more difficult than in other cases 
where funds have been traced through bank deposits. In 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First National 
Bank of Blue Island, 504 F. 2d 998, (7th Cir. 1974), the 
the court, when faced with a similar tracing problem, 
stated: 
Blue Island [Bank] urges us to follow a state-
ment by Professor Grant Gilmore that proceeds 
cease to be identifiable when deposited in a 
bank account, so that the security interest is 
lost when such commingling occurs . . . Never-
theless, examining the language of the Code, in 
the light of its purpose, we conclude that the 
more reasonable implication is that the proceeds 
may be identifiable, and the security interest 
therein survive, even though commingled. Id at 
1002. [Emphasis added.] 
In Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of 
Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Mo., 1973), the court 
upheld a security interest in cash arising out of the sale 
of automobiles and deposited in the automobile dealer's 
bank account. The court held: 
The mere feet that the proceeds from the 
sales of the six automobiles were commingled 
with other funds and subsequent withdrawals 
were made from the commingled account does 
not render the proceeds unidentifiable . . . Id. 
at 324. 
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In Howarth v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 
203 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. P&., 1962), the court assumed 
that if proceeds of collateral could be traced into a bank 
account, such proceeds are deemed to be identifiable and 
subject to a continuing security interest. 
The traoeability of the proceeds of the transferred 
assets is a factual question which must be decided by a 
trial court. 
POINT III. 
ZIONS DOES NOT HAVE TO THIS DATE 
AN ATTACHED AND PERFECTED SECUR-
ITY INTEREST IN THE TRANSFERRED 
ASSETS OR IN THE CASH AND NON-CASH 
PROCEEDS ARISING THEREFROM. 
To be valid, a security interest must attach to the 
collateral. Section 70A-9-2Q4(l) U. C. A., 1953, provides 
that a security interest attaches where: 1. the debtor 
has rights in the collateral; 2. value is given; and 3. there 
is an agreement that it attach. Zions' claimed security 
interest Mis on all three counts. 
1. The extent of Summit's rights in the transferred 
assets is a genuine issue of fact. There is much uncer-
tainty as to what exactly happened on or about January 
1, 1974, when over $2,000,000.00 worth of assets were 
transferred from Nuclear to Summit without any appar-
ent physical movement of goods or without any apparent 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
considenation paid. This entire matter must be explored 
through additional discovery. 
2. Zions' security interest did not attach to the 
transferred assets and/or any proceeds arising therefrom 
because Zions gave no value in exchange for a security in-
terest in these assets. 
The record shows that Zions made its loan (gave 
value) to Summit in December 1972. It is undisputed in 
the record that after the transfer of January 1,1974, Zions 
advanced no new funds to Summit in reliance upon these 
transferred assets or otherwise. 
Zions argued in the lower court that its security in-
terest contained an after-acquired property clause and 
the original loan given in 1972 was in consideration not 
only for Summit's existing inventory and accounts re-
ceivable but also for any after-acquired inventory. How-
ever, this after-acquired property clause cannot apply to 
the transferred assets because these assets were not ac-
quired by Summit in the ordinary course of its business. 
Even though the security agreement contains an after-
acquired property clause, unless the after-acquired prop-
erty is acquired in the debtor's ordinary course of busi-
ness, a security interest will not attach. 70A-9-108 U. C. 
A., 1953, states: 
When After-Acquired Collateral Not Security for 
Antecedent Debt.—Where a secured party makes 
an advance, incurs an obligation,, releases a 
perfected security interest, or otherwise gives 
new value which is to be secured in whole 
or i n p a r t by af ter-acquired property h i s secur i ty 
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interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be 
deemed to be taken for new value and not as 
security for an antecedent debt if the debtor 
acquires his rights in the collateral either in the 
ordinary course of his business or under a con-
tract of purchase made pursuant to the security 
agreement within a reasonable time after new 
value is given. [Emphasis added.] 
In the case at bar, Zions made an advance and gave 
value which was to be secured in part by after-ac-
quired property. Under 70A-9-108 U. C. A., 1953, Zions' 
secuoty agreement in the after-acquired property can 
only be deemed to be taken for new value if Summit ac-
quired its rights in such collateral in the ordinary course 
of its business. The record shows that the transfer was 
not in the ordinary course of business. A book transfer 
of $2,097,184.00 worth of inventory consisting mostly of 
raw materials, work in process and assembly machinery, 
made in conjunction with a shift of Summit's business 
from a marketing entity to a manufacturing entity was 
obviously not in Summit's ordinary course of business. 
Therefore, Zions gave no value for its claimed security 
interest in the transferred assets. 
3. Zions' security interest did not attach to the 
transferred assets and/or any proceeds arising therefrom 
because Summit and Zions neither agreed nor intended 
that Zions' security interest attach to assets which were 
not acquired in Summit's ordinary course of business. 
Zions and Summit signed a security agreement in 
which they agreed that Zions' security interest should 
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attach to inventory and accounts receivable, including 
certain after-acquired property. However, there was no 
agreement or intent that the term "after-acquired prop-
erty" encompass the transferred assets and any proceeds 
arising therefrom. Parties to a security agreement must 
intend that the security agreement attach to particular 
after-acquired property. The intent of the parties is cru-
cial in giving meaning to after-acquired property clauses. 
2 Gilmore, Security Interest in Personal Property, 
Section 35.5, page 931-932 (1965), discusses the circum-
stances under which future transactions may be secured 
under an earlier made agreement. After acknowledging 
that U. C. C. 9-204(5) makes afternacquired property 
clauses valid under some circumstances, Gilmore goes on 
to state: 
However, "covered by the security agreement" 
is to be read, Section 9-204(5) should certainly 
not be taken to overrule the so-called "dragnet" 
cases under the pre-Code law. Legitimate future 
advance arrangements are validated under the 
Code, as indeed they generally were under pre-
Code law. This useful device can, however, be 
abused; it is abused when a lender, relying on a 
broadly drafted clause, seeks to bring within the 
shelter of his security arrangements claims 
against the debtor which are unrelated to the 
course of financing that was contemplated by 
the parties. In the "dragnet" cases, the courts 
have regularly curbed such abuses. No matter 
how the clause is drafted, the future advances, to 
be covered, must "be of the same class as the 
primary obligation . . . and so related to it that 
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the consent of the debtor to its inclusion may L 
be inferred." The same test of "similarity" and 
"relatedness," vague but useful, should be ap-
plied to Section 9-204(5). [Emphasis added.] 
An analagous case to the present situation is John 
Miller Supply Company, Inc. v. Western State Bank, 199 
N. W. 2d 161 (Wis., 1972), which involved a dispute 
between two secured creditors over the interpretation of 
an after-acquired property clause (floaiting lien). The 
court ruled that the intent and contemplation of the 
parties was important in interpreting after-acquired prop-
erty clauses: 
A "floating lien" security agreement will be 
effective according to its own terms, but only if 
those terms or the course of dealing of the parties 
evidence that the real intent of the parties was 
that their subsequent transactions be covered by 
the terms of the security agreement. In the in-
stant case, there is nothing to show that the par-
ties ever intended that their security agreement 
would apply to future contingent liability on exe-
cutory contracts between the parties and which 
were not similar and not related directly to the 
transaction set forth in the original security 
agreements. Id. at 165. [Emphasis added.] 
Even though Zions' security agreement contains small 
print boiler plate language which defined inventory as» 
among other things, ". . . raw materials, work in process 
. . . ," an examination of the real intent of the parties 
disclosed something quite different. Zions did not intend 
to rely on Summit's acquisition of Nuclear's transferred 
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inventory and other assets or the resulting accounts 
receivable when Zions made the loan in 1972. At the 
time Zions made its loan, Summit was not an affiliate of 
Nuclear and was solely engaged in marketing hand calcu-
lators. Manufoctaing activities by Summit were never 
contemplated by either Summit or Zions. Summit's only 
inventory consisted of a small supply of finished goods. 
It had no work in process, component parts, raw mater-
ials or assembly machinery. As Zions could not an-
ticipate the fact that Summit would acquire the trans-
ferred assets, Zions was not relying on that transfer 
when its loan was made. The Record shows that Zions 
looked only to accounts receivable and gave no collateral 
value to Summit's inventory. 
POINT IV. 
THE BULK TRANSFER LAW IS NOT AP-
PLICABLE TO THIS CASE WHICH CON-
CERNS PRIORITIES OF SECURITY IN-
TERESTS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
Zions asserted in the lower court that First Security's 
remedy in this situation was under the Bulk Transfer Law 
and that First Security's decision not to exercise any 
remedy it may have had under that section of the Com-
mercial Code (Article 6) estopped any further action. 
However, whatever remedies First Security has or might 
have had under the Bulk Transfer Law are irrelevant and 
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immaterial to this case. A dispute between two secured 
creditors is governed by the provisions of Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code which deals with secured tran-
sactions (70A-9-101 at seq. U. C. A., 1953). 
The limitation of actions section of the Bulk Transfer 
Law, 70A-6-111 U. C. A., 1953, specifically states: 
Limitation of Actions and Levies.—No action 
under this chapter shall be brought nor levy prior 
to judgment made more than six months after 
the date on which the transferee took possession 
of the goods unless the transfer has been con-
cealed. If the transfer has been concealed, ac-
tions may be brought or levies made within six 
months after its discovery. [Emphasis added.] 
Since the present action is being brought under Article 
9 and not Article 6, the Bulk Transfer Law has no force 
or effect. Official Comment 2 of 70A-6-1G3 U. C. A., 1953, 
states regarding the Bulk Transfer Law: 
In this code, security interests of all kinds are 
regulated by Article 9, Secured Transactions. 
Subsection (1) of this Section therefore ex-
cludes all transfers for security from the opera-
tion of this Article. 
In its treatment of the Bulk Transfer Law, White & Sum-
mers' treatise, Uniform Commercial Code, West Publish-
ing Company, 1972, states on page 656: 
Any remedies that secured creditors of the trans-
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ferw may have under Article 9 (or other law) 
against assets transferred aire not affected by 
Article 6. 
Therefore, any reliance by Zions on the Bulk Trans-
fer Law in this case is misplaced. 
CONCLUSION 
I. THE LOWER COURT'S GRANTING 
OF Z I O N ' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
THAT THERE ARE GENUINE AND MA-
TERIAL ISSUES OF FACT AND IN THAT 
THERE ARE AREAS WHERE ADDITIONAL 
DISCOVERY IS REQUIRED, IE.: 
A) What was the true nature of the "transfer" from 
Nuclear to Summit? 
B) What role, if any, did Zions play in engineering 
the transfer? 
C) What was the intent of the security agreement 
between Zions and Summit? 
D) What did Zions know about First Security's se-
curity interest in the transferred assets at the time of 
transfer? 
E) When did Zions learn about First Security's se-
curity interest in the transferred assets? 
F) Why did Zions refuse to lend Summit any ad-
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ditdonal money after the transfer when Summit's assets 
had nearly doubled? 
G) When and how did Zions become aware of the 
First Security-Summit security agreement and the financ-
ing statement pertaining thereto which was filed on Feb-
ruary 22,1974? 
H) Are the proceeds from the transferred assets 
identifiable and traceable? 
I) Why did Zions allow the assets of Slimmit to be 
dissipated? 
II. FIRST SECURITY HAS A FIRST 
PRIORITY POSITION IN THE TRANS-
FERRED ASSETS AND IN ANY CASH OR 
NON-CASH PROCEEDS ARISING THERE-
FROM AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A) Prior to the transfer of assets from Nuclear to 
Summit on or about January 1, 1974, it is uncontested 
that First Security had a first priority attached and per-
fected security interest in the transferred assets and in 
any proceeds arising therefrom. 
B) First Security's security interest in the trans-
ferred assets and in any proceeds arising therefrom con-
tinued after the transfer from Nuclear to Summit. 
C) Language in the Summit financing statement 
excepting "assets presently subject to security mterest 
of Zions First National Bank" does not reduce or change 
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First Security's security interest in the transferred assets 
because the transferred assets were not presently subject 
to Zions' security interest. 
D) The transferred assets were not subject to 
Zioms' security interest for the following two reasons: 
1. The transferred assets were subject to a pre-
existing security interest of First Security through 
Nuclear; and 
2. Zions did not have an attached and perfected 
security interest in the transferred assets, 
E) Zions did not have an attached and perfected 
security interest in the transferred assets or any proceeds 
arising therefrom for the following three reasons: 
1. Summit's rights in the transferred assets were 
and are uncertain; 
2. Zions gave no value as required by law when 
after-acquired property is not acquired in the ordi-
nary course of business; and 
3. There was no agreement between Zions and 
Summit regarding a security interest in the trans-
ferred assets. 
F) The proceeds from the assets of Summit existing 
at the time of the transfer and the proceeds from the 
transferred assets can be traced and identified by a trier 
of fact. 
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III. THE BULK T R A N S F E R LAW 
DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE AND 
FIRST SECURITY IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS SECTION 
THEREOF. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
DonB. Allen 
H. Brent Beesley 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant, First Se-
curity Bank of Utah, NA. 
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